Combat forces need reliable equipment in order to have a high state of readiness and a high probability of successfully performing their missions. Past experience has shown that fielded systems generally fall short of needed reliability characteristics. This paper summarizes previous studies that have identified possible reasons for reliability shortfalls, and proposes an additional cause -the inability to properly communicate the real user reliability concerns to designers.
Mission Needs Statement (MNS 1
Overall mission needs a r e stated in the MNS. These needs a r e in broad terms that relate to specific assigned mission areas. Trade studies are then performed to identify the best candidate system to satisfy user's overall needs.
Operational Req&igments Document (ORD) Once the candidate system is selected, t h e detailed performance characteristics of the system, including operational reliability and maintainability (R&M) requirements and objectives such as mission reliability, mission capable rate, break rate, and mean time be tween maintenance are documented in the ORD. These and other recommended operational R&M terms are described in A i r Force Pamphlet 57-9 (Kef 2). Note that these R&M requirements are in terms of operational, not contractual R&M characteristics -these requirements are expressed in ways that a r e meaningful to the operations, maintenance, and support communities.
Requirements Correlation Matrix (RCM)
A third document, t h e RCM, summarizes the more important operational requirements in the ORD and correlates them with the associated contractual requirements. I n theory, if the contractual requirements are accurately derived from operational requirements and achieved during the engineering and manufacturing development phase of a program, the resulting product should satisfy the user's operational requirements. The reason for the existence of the RCM stems from experience that shows that operational RBiM needs, especially reliability of avionics, are frequently not achieved.
Reliability Shortfall Examples-
A number of studies have been performed over the past two decades that highlight the shortfall problem. In 1976 George Kern studied 16 And finally, the existence of warranties, especially reliability improvement warranties is another indication of our inability to initially deliver products with needed/desired field reliability characteristics.
Relating Operational and _Contractual R&& Characteristics Rome Laboratory (formerly Rome A i r Development Center) has funded two studies in the 80s that attempt to correlate contractual reliability characteristics with operational reliability performance (Refs 9, 10) . These studies analyze field reliability characteristics (e.g., Mean Time Between
Maintenance -Inherent) with the corresponding contractual reliability values (e.g., contractual requirement, predicted value, and demonstrated value). The relationship formulas from these studies are frequently referred to as "Translators." Although t h e primary purpose of these translators was to provide a tool to project R&M characteristics, the statistical results of these studies also provide a n insight into the variability of t h e data used in t h e studies.
For example, t h e 1989 s t u d y considered a broad data base of electronic equipment and considered variables such as t h e type of host platform (e.g., fighter, transport), the type of equipment functions (e.g., radar, communications), and t h e number of mission/on-off cycles (Ref 10). However, even with these considerations, the reliability translators produce large variances of the estimates. For example, the fighter avionics translators that relate three different field reliability characteristics to the demonstrated MTBF value all have a standard error of t h e estimate that is greater than 1.0 and a mean absolute e r r o r that is greater than 0.8. This latter statistic means that a n estimate derived from these translators will be in e r r o r by approximately plus or minus 80 percent, on the average.
The relatively high variability of this latest translator suggests that perhaps some other, important variable has not been considered. The purpose of this paper is to suggest that a critical missing variable is the effectiveness of the definition for failure in contractual specifications.
Definition of "Failure:
A Classroom Exercise MIL-STD-721C defines reliability as:
( 1) The duration or probability of failure-free performance under stated conditions, or ( 2 ) The probability that an item can perform its intended function for a specified interval under stated conditions. ( Ref 11 ) These two definitions are good in that they define several of the variables that have an effect on reliability characteristics, namely mission duration and conditions (e.g., environmental stresses). In fact, these a r e the variables that have been addressed to date in the RADC translator studies. However, these two definitions focus primarily on the equipment functional characteristics, not on the effects that result from a variety of equipment malfunctions. The recently published DoDI 5000.2 defines reliability with an additional emphasis:
The ability of a system and its parts to perform its mission without failure, degradation, or demand on the support system. (Ref 12) Rather than focusing on equipment functions, this definition focuses on the effects that malfunctions can have on the mission and the support system (i.e., requirements for manpower, spares, support equipment, etc.). Most of the equipment considered in the translator studies I t demonstrated 'I the s pacif ication requirements. However, many of the malfunctions t h a t occur in a reliability demonstration a r e classified as nonchargeable or non relevant for various reasons. I n many cases the classifications are based on the definition of "failure" in the specification or the formal test document. 'The author has seen many Specifications and test documents which list criteria that exclude selected malfunctions, many of which would be reported as a "failure" in t h e field. I n the 1976 Hughes study of 16 avionics items, approximately 70% of the malfunctions observed during formal reliability demonstrations were classified as "nonrelevant . '' For the past five years, I have been using an exercise in class to illustrate the importance of considering "effects" in the definition of "failure." I have developed a list of 26 carefully constructed events, most of which describe actual events that have occurred in test programs or in the field (See appendix). I divide the class into as many as six smaller groups and ask each group to review and determine how many of the 26 events are "failures." To illustrate several points, each group is assigned a different perspective. Table 1 lists the six perspectives and the typical range of "failures" reported by each group. 
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The class discussion t h a t follows shows that, in general, the top three groups developed classification criteria based upon effects. For example, the operators a r e typically concerned about safety and the ability to accomplish the mission; the maintenance technicians are concerned about unscheduled maintenance. On the other hand the two contractor groups a r e primarily concerned about legal responsibility -"It's not m y fault." Almost invariably, the contractor group's primary reference for responsibility is the contract specification.
Note that the number of SPO failures generally falls somewhere between the effects groups and the spec groups. The SPO groups a r e occasionally concerned about the users, but are generally more concerned about the specification. In either case, the exerciseillustrates how there might be a significant gap between t h e field expectations and the delivered product. I t is t h e author's opinion that one of the major reasons that we do not field systems that satisfy user expectations, is that we do not adequately communicate the user perspective and expectations to t h e designers. I believe that most designers want to develop a product that satisfies the user's need. However, many have limited field experience and do not truly understand what is expected. During a "Blue-Two'' visit, a mechanical engineer said: "This is only the second time I've been to an A i r Force Base in my 30-year career. And I don't think that's unusual. Mostly the designers will visit the manufacturer or the company that is making the equipment, but rarely -if ever -the user." (Ref 13) If the above quote is representativeof many design engineers, then their only guidance for designing reliability into equipment is the system/item specification. That specification typically contains a requirement for x hours mean time between failure -MTBF. But unless defined, the term MTBF and specifically t h e term "failure" can mean different things to different people as illustrated in t h e above classroom exercise. Therefore, we need to have a good specification that will communicate the needs of the users (operators, maintainers, logistics support) to the SPO, from the SPO to the prime contractor, and from t h e prime contractor to those supporting subcontractors and vendors that actually perform t h e design function.
To create a communication bridge from the users to the designers, I am suggesting that program offices, with assistancefrom the operators, maintenance technicians, and logistics support personnel, develop an effect-relateddefinition for "failure" to be included in specifications, The following is the author's attempt to develop such a definition, including two important ground rules and some exceptions. Part of this definition is based on MIL-STD-783 D which contains a section that addresses definition of failure. The definition is "generic" and should be tailored for a particular program.
Suggested Specification Definition for --"Failure"
A failure is any condition in which delivered hardware and/or software that is developed, manufactured, procured, or integrated by the contractor does not perform required functions in accordance with Section 3 of the applicable specification or t h e operators manual, and which has one or more of the following effects: a. A s a result of observed or otherwise indicated conditions (e.g., built-in-test (BIT)), the operator must make additional decisions and/or take action in order to accomplish the mission or a s s u r e safety of the system. Included a r e documented "false alarms" -situations where a malfunction is indicated (e.g., BIT), the operator makes a judgment that a malfunction does not exist, but the operator considers the false alarms to adversely affect his ability to perform the mission. [These operator observed events may be reported in the field as Code 2. Code 3, or Code 4 "breaks" depending upon the severity of' the effects. The operational terms "Break Rate" and mean time between mission critical failure (MTBMCF 1 a r e derived from these effect-reiated reports.] b. The end item/system is officially categorized as "down" or unavailable for operation or for a like mission until observed and/or indicated conditions a r e evaluated.
[These downing events are used to quantify availability characteristic such as operational availability, mission capable rate, and mean down time.] c. Maintenance personnel a r e required to expend time to assess and/or correct conditions documented by t h e operators or by maintenance personnel. Also included a r e maintenance actions resulting from time change requirements directed by technical orders. [All corrective maintenance events must be considered when trying to quantify maintenance effort (e.g., maintenance manhours/flight hour) or manpower levels.] d. Material is consumed I bolts, safety wire, sealant, piece parts, etc. 1 and/or replacement of reparable i+?ms (LRUs, SRlis, etc.) is required, [These replacement events are used to compute terms such a s mean time between removal (MTBR). a term related to the need for replacement items (spares). J IMPORTANT GROUND RULE NUMBER 1: Malfunctions shall not be excluded as a result of additional information discovered during maintenance or later failure analysis.
The nature of resulting maintenance actions
DOESNOTCHANGETHEOBSERVEDEFFECT.
For example maintenance may respond to a reported malfunction that causes the system to be down. Even though the technician cannot duplicate (CND) the malfunction on t h e end item, or a removed item bench checks serviceable (BCS) to design and manufacturing personnel. One means to communicate these concerns is through the development of a comprehensive definition for failure that is related to the field "effects" that are inherent in the user's operational reliability characteristics stated in the ORD and RCM. This definition can also help preserve the integrity of the sampling and demonstrating process by not allowing exclusions on the basis of after-the-fact or proposed fixes. 14. An aircraft made an uncommanded maneuver. A software error was found and corrected. This particular malfunction has not recurred as of this date.
--15. The GFE radar warning receiver malfunctioned and was removed. In the shop, moisture (rain) was found.
I _
16. After 3 months, paint began to peel from the fuselage of a new aircraft.
--17. Hail dented the leading edge of a wing. Two panels were replaced.
18. The generator on the number 3 engine malfunctioned in flight.
The unit was removed and repaired at the depot.
19. The cause of the generator malfunction above was determined to be a faulty generator control unit, which was also removed and repaired a t the depot.
-- 
